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I. INTRODUCTION
In most jurisdictions, the business judgment rule protects the directors and
officers of corporations from liability for informed business decisions made in
good faith. Until recently, the prevailing perception was that the same held true
in Louisiana, but this is not so clear anymore. In Theriot v. Bourg,' the First
Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana considered what standard to apply to the
liability of directors and officers of corporations for business decisions. Held,
the standard for imposing liability on corporate officers and directors for their
business decisions is simple, rather than gross negligence. Although this holding
may be defensible from a purely textual standpoint, it fails to recognize how the
business judgment rule has affected the traditional understanding of the statutory
text. As a result, Theriot has changed a fundamental rule of corporate
governance in Louisiana. If the decision is followed, Louisiana courts will no
longer be precluded from second-guessing the business decisions of a corpora-
tion's officers and directors. The decision may impact the willingness of people
to serve on the boards of Louisiana corporations, as well as the ability of these
boards to make the bold entrepreneurial decisions necessary for business success.
H. THE CASE: THERIOT V. BOURG
Theriot v. Bourg concerned a shareholder's derivative action brought by two
minority directors of a closely-held corporation against five majority directors
and a subsidiary of the corporation. Harry Bourg founded the Harry Bourg
Corporation ("HBC") in 1955. After his death, each of his children or their heirs
had a seat on the board of directors and shared equally in the ownership of the
company's stock. From its inception, HBC primarily collected revenue from
mineral leases granted on the 17,000 acres of land it owned.2
However, in May of 1988, anticipating decreases in oil and gas revenues, the
board of directors of HBC voted to diversify by funding a subsidiary called
Bourg Mariculture, Inc. ("BMr'). Three of the majority directors were elected
officers of BMI. The purpose of this subsidiary was to engage in an industry
new to Louisiana, redfish farming. After obtaining one of a limited number of
permits from the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Department, the president of
BMI developed and patented an innovative method of raising redfish in modified
container barges.
3
Copyright 1998, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 691 So. 2d 213 (La. App. Ist Cir.), wt denied, 696 So. 2d 1008 (1997).
2. Id. at 216.
3. Id. at 217.
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BMI purchased the initial batch of redfish in November 1988 and raised
them until May 1989, when some unknown person released them from the
barges. In mid-1990, BMI placed a second group of fish in the barges.
Although some of these fish were sold, an operational problem with the feeding
system destroyed the remainder."
At that time, BMI's president independently entered the redfish raising
industry through his company called 4-C Ranch. The board of HBC agreed that
BMI would advance 4-C Ranch $358,000 for its next batch of fish. However,
before they could be delivered to BMI, Hurricane Andrew destroyed the fish in
August of 1992. BMI made no further attempt to raise fish.'
The plaintiffs' claim was predicated upon the initial decision of the
defendants to diversify HBC's assets by entering into the mariculture business
through BMI in 1988. Also at issue were many of the decisions concerning the
redfish operation made by the board of HBC and by the officers of BMI from
1988 to 1992.6
The jury found that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duty
to HBC under Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:917 which resulted in
damages to HBC in the sum of $5,798,441. The defendants appealed thisjudgment based upon the jury instructions given by the trial court and the
sufficiency of the jury's verdict. The defendants claimed that the trial
court incorrectly instructed the jury that the standard imposed on corporate
directors by Section 91 required a finding of only simple negligence
instead of gross negligence." They also alleged that the court "failed to
emphasize the overwhelming importance of the Business Judgment Rule and
completely negated the impact of the rule by overemphasizing inapplicable
and minor exceptions to the rule."9 Finally, they claimed that the jury
"failed to properly apply the Business Judgment Rule."'" The First
Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana affirmed the trial court's ruling,
stating that the standard of care was simple, rather than gross negli-
gence.t" The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs on the case in a five
to one vote.'
2
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Section 91 of the Louisiana Business Corporation Law reads:
Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation
and its shareholders, and shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good
faith, and with that diligence, care, judgment and skill which ordinarily prudent men
would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions. Nothing herein contained
shall derogate from any indemnification authorized by R.S. 12:83.
8. Therfot, 691 So. 2d at 221.
9. Id. at 218.
10. Id. at 224.
11. Id. at214.
12. Theriot v. Bourg, 691 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 696 So. 2d 1008 (1997).
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IMI. THE DuTY OF CARE
A. Jurisprudential Development of the Duty of Care
The directors and officers of a corporation may be liable to the corporation
and its shareholders for breaching a duty to exercise reasonable care in the
management of the corporation's affairs. 3 This duty of care developed well
before states began to promulgate it in statutes. In fact, it has its origins in the
common law of trusts and agency of England. 4 In Charitable Corp. v.
Sutton,s decided over two hundred and fifty years ago, an English court
presented this following "remarkably modem formulation"'6 of the duty: "[b]y
accepting of a trust of this sort, a person is obliged to execute it with fidelity and
reasonable diligence.... . 7  The court found the directors of a corporation
personally liable for failing to follow the loan procedures of the corporation in
making unsecured loans to fellow directors, acts which constituted gross
negligence according to the court." These concepts of fidelity and reasonable
diligence are still the foundations of the fiduciary duty of corporate directors
today.
The early American cases applied this duty to bank officers and directors.
Remarkably, the first time an American appellate court reviewed the decisions
of bank directors was in a Louisiana Supreme Court case, Percy v. Millaudon,'9
which held that corporate directors are required to practice ordinary care in the
exercise of their duties. The case involved liability for losses resulting from
defalcations by the bank's president and treasurer. Analogizing bank directors
to agents, the court stated that in some situations they will be required to
exercise:
the utmost diligence ... (and will be) ... responsible for the slightest
neglect. There are others, where the duties imposed are presumed to
call for nothing more than ordinary care and attention, and where the
exercise of that degree of care suffices.
The directors of banks from the nature of their undertaking, fall
within the class last mentioned, while in the discharge of their ordinary
duties.20
13. La. R.S. 12:91 (1968).
14. Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment
Rule, 19 Del. I. Corp. L. 971, 973 (1994).
15. 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742).
16. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 591, 593
n.7 (1983).
17. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. at 645.
18. Id. at 644-45.
19. 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829).
20. Id. at 74-75.
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This language is strikingly similar to the current statutory duty imposed to act
as the "ordinarily prudent man."' Throughout the nineteenth-century, the
Louisiana Supreme Court continued to analogize the duty owed by corporate
directors to an agency relationship, as done in Sutton.2"
Later American courts extended the concept to include the directors of non-
banking corporations. The Rhode Island Supreme Court expressed its formula-
tion of the duty in Hodges v. New England Screw Co.23  In Hodges, the
corporate directors of the New England Screw Company were sued for an ultra
vires purchase of stock in another corporation. In a succinct analysis, the court
recognized the violation of the corporate charter, but refused to find personal
liability, stating:
The question then will be, was such violation the result of mistake as
to their powers, and if so, did they fall into this mistake from want of
proper care, such care as a man of ordinary prudence practices in his
own affairs. For, if the mistake be such as with proper care might have
been avoided, they ought to be liable. If, on the other hand, the mistake
be such as the directors might well make, notwithstanding the exercise
of proper care, and if they acted in good faith and for the benefit of the
Screw Company, they ought not to be liable.24
Finding that the directors had exercised proper care, the court dismissed the
claim against them.
In an oft-cited case, the United States Supreme Court pronounced in Briggs
v. Spaulding's that directors should be held to a duty to act with the care that
"ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under similar circumstanc-
es." Thereafter, American courts, following Briggs, nearly universally defined
the duty of care required of corporate directors in terms of the conduct of a
reasonable and prudent man. 6
B. Statutory Duty of Care
In Louisiana, the applicable duty of care is now provided by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 12:91, which reads:
Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation
to the corporation and its shareholders, and shall discharge the duties of
21. La. &.S. 12:91 (1968).
22. See Raymond v. Palmer, 35 La. Ann. 276,277 (La. 1883), where the court in dealing with
a mismanagement claim against directors of a bank stated, "Officers and directors are mandataries
of the corporation, and, as such, they are liable to their principal for breaches of the duties assumed
by them."
23. 1 RI. 312 (RI. 1850).
24. Id. at 346.
25. 141 U.S. 132, 152, 11 S. Ct. 924, 931 (1891).
26. Horsey, supra note 14, at 974.
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their respective positions in good faith, and with that diligence,
care, judgment and skill which ordinary prudent men would
exercise under similar circumstances in like positions. Nothing
herein contained shall derogate from any indemnification authorized
by R.S. 12:83.
The predecessor statute to Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:91 was nearly identical
to the present one. It, in turn, was very similar to a 1928 statute, which
contained the first Louisiana statutory standard of care27 that was taken nearly
verbatim from the Model Business Corporation Act of 1928.28 Louisiana
Revised Statutes 12:91 is similar to the statutory standard of care found in many
other states and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act29 and the
American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project."
C. Behavior That Constitutes a Breach of This Duty
Although directors and officers clearly have a fiduciary duty to their
corporations, the type of behavior required to breach this duty is unclear. As in
tort law, this "ordinarily prudent man" standard for directors is difficult to
define. What amounts to ordinary care or a lack of it depends on the facts of the
particular case." The existence of a breach of the duty is determined by a
number of factors. These include the duties imposed by a corporation's charter,
the good or bad faith of the directors' conduct, the officers' or directors' actual
or imputed knowledge of corporate affairs, the residence of the officer or
27. 1928 La. Acts No. 250, § 36.
28. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 33 (1928).
29. The Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(a) (1984) states:
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a
committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
30. The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance § 4.01(a) states:
(a) A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's or
officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person
would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstanc-
es. ...
(I) The duty in Subsection (a) includes the obligation to make, or cause to be made an
inquiry when, but only when, the circumstances would alert a reasonable director or
officer to the need therefor. The extent of such inquiry shall be such as the director or
officer reasonably believes to be necessary ....
31. 3A William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
§ 1035 (penn. ed. 1986).
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director, the time of the alleged breach, and any personal gains of the directors
or officers.32
Commentators disagree about the level of care required by the "ordinarily
prudent person" standard.33 Because of this ambiguity, one commentator
remarked that the statute has "left the courts only a nebulous guide. '34
Although the statute makes no reference to the concepts of ordinary or gross
negligence, courts have turned to these standards to determine what the language
means.35 An early commentator, noting the varying interpretations given to the
statute, wrote:
In determining the degree of care which directors and officers must
exercise, courts have run the gamut, from the rigorous requirement that
such officers must exercise the care which the ordinary prudent man
would "use in his own business," to the view that they are to be held
[liable] only in case of "gross negligence. 36
"Ordinarily prudent man" seems to imply that the same level of care is required
as in an ordinary negligence case, i.e. simple negligence. One scholar agrees,
arguing that three-fourths of jurisdictions interpret the "ordinary prudent man"
standard to require only a showing of simple negligence." On the other hand,
another author disputes this, stating that in practice the standard is one of gross
negligence.
In Theriot, the first circuit held that the Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:91
provides for a simple negligence standard in Louisiana.-" This result conflicts
with Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Insurance Co.,4" where the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Louisiana jurisprudence, found
that the standard was gross negligence.
32. James R. Pettway, Comment, Duty of Corporate Officers and Directors in Louisiana, 29
La. L. Rev. 691, 692-93 (1969). See also Commercial Germania Trust & Sav. Bank v. Jurgens, 64
So. 703 (1914); Semple v. Frisco Land Co., 50 So. 619 (1909); Bourdette v. Sieward, 31 So. 630
(1902); Trisconi v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45, 9 So. 29 (1891); Pontchartrain R.R. Co. v. Paulding,
I I La. 41 (1837); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829); and Faurie v. Millaudon, 3 Mart
(n.s.) 476 (La. 1825).
33. E. Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, CodifiedStandard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted
Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Core Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. Law.
919, 926 (1980).
34. Pettway, supra note 32, at 692.
35. Louisiana World Expo. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 1147, 1149 (5th Cir. 1989).
36. Dale E. Bennett, The Louisiana Business Corporation Act of 1928,2 La. L. Rev. 597, 640
(1940).
37. Veasey & Manning, supra note 33, at 926 n.31.
38. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks andDecoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 Yale L.J. 1078, 1101 (1968).
39. Theriot, 691 So. 2d at 222.
40. 864 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Adding to the confusion is Dupuy v. Riley,4' where the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal, without explicitly saying it was doing so, seemingly applied a
simple negligence standard. However, it could be argued that the court actually
employed a gross negligence standard in making its ruling. In Dupuy, an officer
of a corporation was sued for signing checks that the majority shareholder used
to misappropriate a considerable sum of money. Although the court found that
the officer had not conspired with the majority shareholder, it still found her
personally liable. Because the misappropriation was obvious and long-standing,
it can be argued that the officer's conduct was grossly negligent. In addition, the
corporation's manager had inquired about the checks, and the officer failed to
respond to this inquiry.
Even though the acts of negligence in Dupuy were of the non-decision-
making variety, the case does make it clear that an argument exists for the
application of a simple negligence standard. Nevertheless, since Dupuy did not
involve the decisions of a corporate director concerning the corporation, it should
not have influenced the Theriot decision.
However, an inquiry into the correct standard is not necessary in cases
involving decisions made by the directors and officers. In fact, the duty applied
by courts is intimately linked to, and limited by, the business judgment rule."'
As one writer has stated,
In many instances... the question of the exact parameters of the duty
of care is rendered moot because of the application of the business
judgment rule: so long as a decision of the directors has a rational
basis, and was made in good faith and for what they honestly believed
to be in the best interest of the shareholders, it will not be reviewed by
a court.43
Thus, the use of the "ordinary prudent man" standard is misleading. A federal
district court noted the importance was not in "the technical labels given to the
standard of care, but to the latitude afforded to directors in their decisions.""
IV. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. Generally
The business judgment rule has existed in corporate law since the 1820's..4
One treatise has defined it, stating:
41. 557 So. 2d 703, 709 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
42. Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and
the Business Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 Bus. Law. 1237, 1238 (1986).
43. Wendell H. Holmes, The Revised Model Business Corporation Act and Corporate Law
Reform in Mississippi: Part One, 56 Miss. L. 165, 191 (1986).
44. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (E.D. La. 1992).
45. S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 93, 97 (1979).
19981
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
If in the course of management, directors arrive at a decision within the
corporation's powers (intra vires) and their authority, for which there
is a reasonable basis, and they act in good faith, as the result of their
independent discretion and judgment, and uninfluenced by any
consideration other than what they honestly believe to be the best
interests of the corporation, a court will not interfere with the internal
management and substitute its judgment for that of the directors to
enjoin or set aside the transaction or to surcharge the directors for any
resulting loss.46
Simply put, "directors ought not be liable for honest mistakes of judgment or
unpopular business decisions."'" The American Law Institute's Corporate
Governance Project has promulgated a statutory expression of the rule.4" Yet
another well-stated formulation of the rule is found in Cramer v. General
Telephone & Electronics Corp., which states that "[a]bsent bad faith or some
other corrupt motive, directors are normally not liable to the corporation for
mistakes of judgment ......
The duty of care and the business judgment rule are "two distinct, but
interrelated concepts.""0 While the duty of care applies to all the actions of the
directors and officers, the business judgment rule applies strictly in the decision-
making context. Some commentators believe the business judgment rule has
been too broadly interpreted. "Although the doctrine began as an adjunct to duty
of care standards designed to protect directors' decisions against hindsight
evaluation when appropriate diligence had been exercised, the doctrine has
enveloped the primary inquiry."s' One writer doubted whether a viable
shareholder action against directors still existed save for cases of fraud, self-
interest, disloyalty, or the disclosure concerns of securities law.
Thus, a consequence of this doctrine is the guarantee of a limitation of
liability of directors and officers who in good faith and with reasonable diligence
commit errors in judgment. Undoubtedly, the rule has proven to be a powerful
defense against claims by shareholders for losses resulting from injurious
46. Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, Law of Corporations § 242 (3d ed. 1983).
47. Arsht, supra note 45, at 96.
48. ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance § 4.01(c):
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty
under this Section if the director or officer.
(1) is not interested [§ 1.23] in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the
director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation.
49. 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978).
50. Holmes, supra note 43, at 189.
51. Cohn, supra note 16, at 594.
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decisions. 2 Since the cases where directors are found liable for their
good-faith decisions are so rare, one commentator compared searching for
cases that imposed liability to searching for "a very small number of
needles in a very large haystack 5 3 and another has called the inquiry a
"relatively fruitless search."'
B. Application
The application of the business judgment rule is an examination of the
decision-makingprocess, not of the decision itself. One writer summarizing its
application, stated, "[w]hile it is agreed... that the directors must meet a kind
of negligence standard for the decision-making process, it is the author's strong
belief that any hint that such a standard be applied to the substance of the
decision must be negated."ss He continued, "The key point is that a director's
legal duty of care cannot be measured by result. It should be measured only by
process: Was the director careful to be informed?"56
There are two tests to determine whether or not the process of decision-,
making meets the standard of care. The first is whether the directors reasonably
researched and ascertained the relevant information and law necessary for the
decision." The second is whether the deliberations of the board were reason-
able.' s Smith v. Van Gorkom59 synthesized these two tests into one rule:
directors must take appropriate steps to become informed before a decision.
The Delaware Supreme Court held in Aronson v. Lewis that the
standard for measuring this process is gross negligence. "Thus, the due
care standard in corporate law is applied to the decision-making process
and not to its result."6'
The business judgment rule acts as a qualification on the statutory duty
of care. The business judgment rule renders moot the debate about
whether the standard of care is simple or gross negligence. For "so long
as a decision of the directors has a rational basis, and was made in good
faith and for what they honestly believed to be in the best interests of the
shareholders, [the substance of the decision] will not be reviewed by the
court.9
6 2
52. Krishnan Chittur, The Corporate Director's Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future,
10 Del. J. Corp. L. 505, 507 (1985).
53. Bishop, supra note 38, at 1099.
54. Hansen, supra note 42, at 1245.
55. Id. at 1239.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1241.
58. Id.
59. 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
60. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
61. Hansen, supra note 42, at 1241.
62. Holmes, supra note 43, at 191.
1998]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
C. Policies
The justification of the business judgment rule is based upon "the
fundamental premises" underlying the rule that humans are, by nature,
fallible and not able to please stockholders at all times."3 "The first
premise recognizes human nature, the second the need to foster both
business and judicial economy by not allowing every corporate transaction
to be subject to judicial review at the request of a disagreeing stockhold-
er."' " One commentator states that it is the "foundation stone" of modem
corporate law that "there must be a minimum of interference by the courts
in internal corporate affairs.""61 Courts should be hesitant to second-guess
the decisions of directors with the benefit of hindsight. This, coupled
with a desire for judicial economy, provides sufficient justification for the
rule.
If courts question and hold corporate directors personally liable for the
substance of their decisions, few people will serve as directors." This type of
discouragement could severely impact the quality of people on corporate boards.
Without qualified people, in theory, the decisions of the boards will become less
and less productive. It can be argued that without the protection that the
business judgment rule gives directors, the quality of their decisions will decline,
rather than improve.
The final, and perhaps most compelling, justification for the rule is the
realizationthat decisions in the corporate world often involve an inherent element
of risk.67 "[I]mposing a kind of trustee mentality based upon the 'ordinarily
prudent person' test will tend to eliminate those bold entrepreneurial decisions
that have resulted in major economic benefit., 68 Throughout the history of
business, the decisions involving highest amounts of risk have had the
highest returns. Arguably, without the business judgment rule, most of these
risky decisions will not be made. For directors, the cost of making such
decisions would greatly outweigh the benefits. As a result, innovation will be
stifled.
D. The Business Judgment Rule: In Louisiana
Along with being the first American case to establish the duty of care, Percy
v. Millaudon69 has been cited as the "earliest American expression" of the
63. Arsht, supra note 45, at 95.
64. Id.
65. Hansen, supra note 42, at 1239.
66. Id.
67. Arsht, supra note 45, at 100.
68. Hansen, supra note 42, at 1239.
69. 8 Mart (n.s.) at 68 (La. 1829).
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business judgment rule."0 The Louisiana Supreme Court, in a "discourse as
relevant today as it was"' then, articulated the rule,
[W]e are of the opinion that on the occurrence of difficulties, in the
exercise of [ordinary duties], which offer only a choice of measures, the
adoption of a course from which loss ensues cannot make the agent
responsible .... The test of responsibility therefore should be. .* the
possession of ordinary knowledge; and by shewing [sic] that the error
of the agent is of so gross a kind, that a man of common sense, and
ordinary attention, would not have fallen into it."2
In Watkins v. North American Land & Timber Co.,73 the court again recognized
the application of this rule in Louisiana. Watkins concerned an action by a
stockholder in a corporation to have a sale of land by the officers rescinded for
lesion beyond moiety. 4 The plaintiff alleged that the officers sold the land for
one-seventh of its value, an act that constituted "gross mismanagement" by the
officers." Recognizing that "[t]he reluctance of the courts to interfere at the
instance of a stockholder, or of a minority of the stockholders, with the affairs
of a private corporation is very pronounced," the court then stated that:
Other decisions emphasize the principle that the courts of equity cannot
undertake the management of all private corporations in this country;
that in the absence of usurpation, of fraud, or of gross negligence, they
will not interfere, but will allow the majority to rule, and leave
dissatisfied stockholders to redress their grievance through ordinary
corporate methods .... Individual stockholders cannot question in
judicial proceedings the corporate acts of directors, if the same are
within the powers of the corporation, and in furtherance of its purposes,
are not unlawful or against good morals, and are done in good faith
and in the exercise of an honest judgment .... To hold otherwise
would be to substitute the judgment and discretion of others in place of
those determined on by the scheme of incorporation.
7 6
Thus, the court wholeheartedly adopted the business judgment rule, along with
its exceptions.
In a subsequent case, the supreme court employed business judgment rule
language in affirming the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs suit. In Reliance
70. Arsht, supra note 45, at 97.
71. Id.
72. 8 Mart. (n.s.) at 78 (La. 1829).
73. 31 So. 683 (La. 1902).
74. The sale ofan immovable may be rescinded for lesion when the price is less than one half
of the fair market value of the immovable. See La. Civ. Code art. 2589.
75. WatkIns, 31 So. at 685.
76. Id. at 686-87 (emphasis added by court).
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Homestead Association v. Nelson,' a case involving the president of a
homestead association who allegedly made an erroneous payment, the court
stated, "it is a well-recognized rule, by both the federal and state courts, that an
executive officer of a corporation cannot be held liable for errors of judgment,
where he acts with reasonable care, without corrupt intent, and in good faith,
unless his acts are unlawful per se or ultra vires." This language undoubtedly
expresses the Louisiana Supreme Court's acceptance of the business judgment
rule as a qualification on the duty of care.
V. ANALYSIS: THE THERIOT DECISION
In Theriot v. Bourg,78 the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal seeming-
ly ignored the history of application of the business judgment rule in Louisiana
by upholding the trial court's finding of liability on the part of the majority
directors.79 The first circuit held that the standard of care applicable to the
directors and officers of a corporation was simple, rather than gross negligence.
Assuming for a moment that this aspect of the court's holding was correct, the
court's decision remains inadequate, having given no consideration to the
business judgment rule's qualification of this standard of care.
To reach its conclusions, the Theriot court relied heavily on its second Pool
v. Pool80 decision (Pool 11). However, the court first acknowledged the
language of its first Pool v. Pool" case (Pool 1) which stated that:
Directors are not liable for mere errors of judgment on their part where
they act in good faith. They are only required to exercise reasonable
care and diligence and act in good faith. But they are liable for willful
neglect of duty, gross negligence or other fraudulent breach of trust.8 2
The defendants argued that this language mandated the use of a gross negligence
standard. After first stating that the language was dicta, and thus not dispositive
of the issue, the court then reasoned that the defendants had misinterpreted the
language.
The court found that gross negligence was simply an example of the type of
behavior that would result in liability for the board of directors. The court noted
that, "In Pool[I] we stated that gross negligence would result in liability, rather
than liability must be predicated on a finding of gross liability as asserted by the
appellants. 8 3 It seems unlikely that the Pool I court was merely presenting
some examples of behavior that would result in liability in its statement, "[b]ut
77. 154 So. 734 (La. 1934).
78. 691 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 696 So. 2d 1008 (1997).
79. Id. at 216.
80. 22 So. 2d 131 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1945).
81. 16 So. 2d 132 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1943).
82. Id. at 135.
83. Therfot, 691 So. 2d at 222.
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they are liable for willful neglect of duty, gross negligence or other fraudulent
breach of trust.""' The Pool I court would not have listed the more obvious
examples of behavior that would cause liability while omitting the more
questionable behavior such as simple negligence. The Theriot court's interpreta-
tion of its Pool I decision simply fails to make sense.
In Theriot, the first circuit failed to recognize the language as a reformula-
tion of the business judgment rule. As stated before, the Cramer court's wording
of the rule was, "Absent bad faith or some other corrupt motive, directors are
normally not liable for mistakes of judgment.""5 This language is strikingly
similar to, "directors are not liable for mere errors of judgment on their part
where they act in good faith.""' By ignoring the Pool I court's application of
the business judgment rule, the court in Theriot was able to hold the majority
directors personally liable under a simple negligence standard. The court quoted
the following passage: "[D]irectors [are] only required to exercise reasonable
diligence and act in good faith and with that judgment and discretion which
ordinarily prudent men exercise under similar circumstances.""" While this
language is no doubt a correct statement of the duty, it must be interpreted in
light of the business judgment rule.
As for the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding in Louisiana
World Exposition v. Federal Insurance Co.,"s the Theriot court simply stated,
"[W] e are not persuaded by this federal jurisprudence. . . ." Interestingly,
although the Louisiana Supreme Court seemedunimpressed by the Fifth Circuit's
jurisprudence, the Delaware Supreme Court has been more attentive, citing
Mansfield Harwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson89 on which Louisiana World
Exposition had relied.'
Finally, after claiming to have "thoroughly" searched for cases requiring
gross negligence to support personal liability for corporate directors and officers,
the court relied on a plain language argument. "For reasons stated above, we
... find that the applicable standard is that which is set forth by the plain
language of LSA-R.S. 12:91." 9' Again, this would be a valid argument if the
language of the statute was "clear and unambiguous."'92 As stated above, there
is much scholarly debate as to what type of behavior constitutes a breach of the
corporate directors' fiduciary duty.
In addition, at the time that the statute was written, the business judgment
rule was a firmly accepted jurisprudential creation. The promulgators of the
84. 16 So. 2d at 135.
85. 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978).
86. Pool, 16 So. 2d at 135.
87. Pool v. Pool, 22 So. 2d 131, 133 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1945).
88. 864 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1989).
89. 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1959).
90. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corporation, 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981).
91. Theriot, 691 So. 2d at 222.
92. See La. Civ. Code art. 9.
1998]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
statute knew it existed; therefore, the statute should be interpreted in light of this
fact. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has previously stated, "it is more likely
that the legislative approval and codification of a broad, general jurisprudential
principle carries with it approval of, or acquiescence in, contemporaneously
developed auxiliary rules used by the courts to implement the principle, unless
there is a contrary principle."93
Because of the first circuit's failure to apply or even acknowledge the
business judgment rule, it questioned the substance of the decisions of the board
of directors instead of the process of decision-making. As discussed above,
Louisiana courts should apply the standard of care to the directors' process of
informing themselves before making the decision, not to the substance of the
decision itself.94
Even under the incorrect analysis employed by the court in the Theriot case,
the result reached still seems unfair. Three of the defendants were in their
seventies or eighties, and none of thp majority directors had completed college
or had any formal education in running a business." The defendants relied on
their attorney, their geologist, an environmental expert, and the owner of a
redfish raising business in Mississippi in deciding to create BMI. 9" The
reasonable reliance of directors on the advice of experts is allowed under
statute.97 Stating that none of these experts had any experience in the fish
raising business in Louisiana, the first circuit held that the defendants' reliance
on their advice was unreasonable.
The court did note that the president of BMJ spent consideralle time with
the owner of a Mississippi redfish farm, viewed his physical plant, and discussed
his methods of operation, prior to the board's decision to enter the business.s
But the court stated that the owner's experience was "limited to operating a
relatively new business that provided only part of the function that BMI
ultimately undertook" and that his business was located in Mississippi while the
93. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986).
94. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 885 (Del. 1985).
95. 7hertot, 691 So. 2d at 224.
96. Id.
97. La. F-S. 12:92(E) (1994) states:
A director shall, in the performance of his duties, be fully protected in relying in good
faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports,
or statements presented to the corporation, the board of directors, or any committee
thereof by any of the corporation's officers or employees, or by any committee of the
board of directors, or by any counsel, appraiser, engineer, including a petroleum reservoir
engineer, or independent or certified public accountant selected with reasonable care by
the board of directors or any committee thereof or any officer having the authority to
make such selection, or by any other person as to matters the director reasonably believes
are within such other person's professional or expert competence and which person is
selected with reasonable care by the board of directors or any committee thereof or any
officer having the authority to make such selection.
98. Theriot, 691 So. 2d at 224.
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defendant's operation was in Louisiana.99 The court seemed to be implying that
the only reasonable source for expert opinion would have been a Louisiana
redfish farmer who used containerbarges as containment units. However, as the
court recognized, the method of raising redfish in modified container barges was
a novel technique.'00 In fact, the whole industry of raising redfish was new to
Louisiana,' and there were no true "experts" in this new field. Restricting the
defendants in this way seems somewhat unreasonable and illogical.
The ruling also seems to be applying hindsight scrutiny on the directors'
decisions. An evaluation of the short existence of BMI does not reveal a poorly-
run business, but simply an unfortunate one. Some unknown person released the
initial batch of fish after six months in the cages.' The court did not explain
how the release of the fish was a consequence of the negligence of the directors.
The court did not say that security measures were deficient or that corporate
employees were poorly trained. The court apparently assumed that a director's
decision to engage in a redfish fanning venture was in itself negligent if,
somehow, the fish being raised at the farm happened to be accidentally released.
Further, BMI did make some money from the second batch of fish before they
were destroyed by an operational problem with the feed. 3 Although the
directors could theoretically bear some responsibility for this mishap, if, for
example, they hired obviously incompetent personnel, a finding of liability can
not conceivably be based on the simple fact that losses occurred. Finally, the
complete destruction of the barges by Hurricane Andrew cannot be a basis for
the directors' negligence."0 4 A decision-maker should not be held personally
liable for unforeseeable, unpreventable events.
VI. EFFECTS OF THE DECISION
The Theriot decision elucidates many of the problems that occur without the
protection of the business judgment rule. The rule was designed to remedy the
problem of second-guessing by courts with the benefit of hindsight. Interference
by the courts with the business decisions of directors of corporations ex post
facto is unfair and impractical. If easily subjected to personal liability,
competent people will be discouraged from serving on corporate boards. Finally,
risk-taking, and with it innovation, will be stifled, when directors, fearing suits
for risky decisions that do not work out, take only the safest routes through the
corporate maze.
Louisiana does not need this damage to its corporations law. Almost every
other jurisdiction in the country recognizes the business judgment rule. Already,
99. Id. at 225.
100. Id. at 217.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Louisiana is viewed as a place unfriendly to businesses, and this decision only
makes matters worse. If businesses are discouraged from incorporating here,
Louisiana's economy will ultimately feel the repercussions.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:24(C)(4) states that the corporation can
indemnify its officers and directors for any personal liability imposed because of
a breach of their duty of care.' °5 A similar statute was developed in the 1980's
in Delaware as a response to the Smith v. Van Gorkom °5 decision. Statutes of
this type now exist in all states, yet all states continue to recognize the businessjudgment rule. Still, even though many corporations can avoid the problems
involved with the Theriot decision, it reflects the Louisiana judiciary's attitude
toward business. The businesses that will be most effectedby this ruling will be
the small, unsophisticated corporations which lack the benefit of an experienced
corporate counsel.
VII. SOLUIONS TO THE PROBLEM
As a temporary remedy, corporate attorneys need to ensure that their clients
are shielded from personal liability for negligent decisions. The only way to
guarantee protection from a Theriot-like lawsuit is to advise clients to amend
their corporate charters to include the indemnification clause allowed by Section
24 of Louisiana Corporations law. This should provide a sufficient safeguard for
the board of directors and officers from personal liability.
For a more long term solution, legislative action is necessary to alleviate the
problems created by Theriot. In the 1980's, the legislature rectified a similar
problem that existed in the banking industry. Because of the savings and loan
crisis, the Louisiana Legislature amended the statute that provides the duty of
care for officers and directors of banks.' °7 That statute now requires a finding
of gross negligence to hold a bank director liable for a breach of his duty of
care.' The same should be done with Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:91; there
is no justifiable reason for affording greater protection to the directors of banks
than to the directors of other corporations. In addition, the legislative amend-
105. La. ItS. 12:24(c)(4) (1994).
106. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
107. La. ItS. 6:291 (Supp. 1998) which now states:
A. Bank and bank holding company officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in
a fiduciary relation to their bank or bank holding company and its stockholders and shall
discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith and with that diligence,
care, judgment, and skill as provided in Subsection B of this section ....
B. A director or officer of a bank or bank holding company shall not be held personally
liable to the corporation or the shareholders thereof for monetary damages unless the
director or officer acted in a grossly negligent manner as defined in R.S. 6:2 or engaged
in conduct which demonstrates a greater disregard of the duty of care than gross
negligence, including intentional tortious conduct or intentional breach of his duty of
loyalty.
108. Id.
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ment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:91 should embody the business judgment
rule and return the jurisprudence to its pre-Theriot state. The ALI's Principles
of Corporate Governance section 4.01 provides a good model provision for both
the duty of care and the business judgment rule. 10 9 The following formulation
of the business judgment rule is found in Section 4.01(c):
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith
fulfills the duty under this Section if the director or officer:
(1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business
judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably
believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best
interests of the corporation ....
This model provision is a concise, lucid formulation of the business judgment
rule which would help guide Louisiana courts in decisions involving corporate
governance and prevent unjust decisions like Theriot from occurring in the
future.
Thomas M. McEachin
109. The duty is contained in ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance § 4.01(a) which states:
(a) A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's or
officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person
would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstanc-
es....
(i) The duty in Subsection (a) includes the obligation to make, or cause to be made,
an inquiry when, but not only when, the circumstances would alert a reasonable director
or officer to the need therefor. The extent of such inquiry shall be such as the director
or officer reasonably believes to be necessary ....
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